HPE6-A78 Exam Dumps - HP Aruba-ACNSA Questions and Answers

Devices use the Diffie-Hellman exchange to agree on a shared secret in a secure manner over an insecure network. The main purpose of this cryptographic protocol is to enable two parties to establish a shared secret over an unsecured communication channel. This shared secret can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher. The Diffie-Hellman exchange is particularly valuable because it allows the secure exchange of cryptographic keys over a public channel without the need for a prior shared secret. This protocol is a foundational element for many secure communications protocols, including SSL/TLS, which is used to secure connections on the internet. References to the Diffie-Hellman protocol and its uses can be found in standard cryptographic textbooks and documentation such as those from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and security protocol specifications.

The main distinction between a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack and a traditional Denial of Service (DoS) attack is that a DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, whereas a DoS attack originates from a single device. This distinction is critical because the distributed nature of a DDoS attack makes it more difficult to mitigate. Multiple attacking sources can generate a higher volume of malicious traffic, overwhelming the target more effectively than a single source, as seen in a DoS attack. DDoS attacks exploit a variety of devices across the internet, often coordinated using botnets, to flood targets with excessive requests, leading to service degradation or complete service denial.

References:

• Cybersecurity texts and resources that differentiate between types of denial of service attacks.
• Technical documentation and analysis of DDoS tactics, which illustrate how botnets and other distributed systems are employed to execute attacks.

ArubaOS-Switches can use sFlow technology to sample network traffic and send the samples to a collector, such as ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM), for analysis. sFlow can be configured to capture various types of traffic, including HTTP, which typically contains User-Agent strings that can be used for device fingerprinting and classification.

To support the requirement for using HTTP User-Agent strings to classify endpoints, the switches would need to be configured to send sFlow samples containing HTTP traffic to CPPM. CPPM would then analyze these samples and use the User-Agent strings to classify the devices.

Therefore, the correct action to configure ArubaOS-Switches would involve:

• Configuring CPPM as the sFlow collector on the switches.
• Enabling sFlow on the edge ports that connect to endpoints.

This approach allows the network traffic to be analyzed by CPPM without requiring any additional mirroring or redirection of traffic, which would be resource-intensive and potentially disruptive to network performance.

The primary purpose of an Initialization Vector (IV) in encryption is to ensure that the same plaintext encrypted with the same encryption key will produce different ciphertext each time it is encrypted. This variability is crucial for securing repetitive data patterns and preventing certain types of cryptographic attacks, such as replay or pattern analysis attacks. The IV adds randomness to the encryption process, making it more secure by ensuring that encrypted messages are unique, even if the plaintext and key remain unchanged. This prevents attackers from deducing patterns or inferring any useful information from repeated ciphertext.

If clients cannot authenticate and there is no record of the authentication attempt in Aruba ClearPass Access Tracker, two possible problems that could cause this symptom are:

• The RADIUS shared secret does not match between the switch and CPPM. This mismatch would prevent the switch and CPPM from successfully communicating, so authentication attempts would fail, and no record would appear in Access Tracker.
• CPPM does not have a network device profile defined for the switch's IP address. Without a network device profile, CPPM would not recognize authentication attempts coming from the switch and would not process them, resulting in no logs in Access Tracker.

The other options are incorrect because:

• Users logging in with the wrong credentials would still generate an attempt record in Access Tracker.
• Clients configured to use a mismatched EAP method would also generate an attempt record in Access Tracker.
• Clients not configured to trust the root CA certificate for CPPM's RADIUS/EAP certificate might fail authentication, but the attempt would still be logged in Access Tracker.

Referring to the exhibit, the ArubaOS Mobility Controller treats HTTPS packets based on the firewall rules applied to the client. The rule that allows svc-https service for destination IP range 10.1.0.0 255.255.0.0 would permit an HTTPS packet to 10.1.10.10 since this IP address falls within the specified range. There are no rules shown that would allow traffic to the IP address 203.0.13.5; hence, the packet to this address would be dropped.

References:

• ArubaOS firewall configuration guides detailing how firewall rules are interpreted and applied to traffic.
• Network security textbooks explaining firewall rule processing and packet filtering based on source and destination IP addresses.

For an ArubaOS-CX switch enforcing 802.1X on a port without any fallback options or port-access roles configured, and where the supplicant on the connected client has not completed authentication, the only type of traffic the authenticator accepts from the client is EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol). EAP is a universal authentication framework used in 802.1X for message exchange during the authentication process. The switch allows EAP packets because they are necessary for the client and the authentication server to perform the authentication process. This is standard behavior for 802.1X authenticators, which is to permit EAP traffic to pass through even before authentication is successful to facilitate the authentication exchange. This information is supported by the IEEE 802.1X standard and ArubaOS-CX security configuration guides.

When dealing with a failed 802.1X authentication attempt to a WLAN enforced by Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) where no record of the attempt is seen in ClearPass Access Tracker, a good next troubleshooting step is to check the CPPM Event Viewer. Since you are able to successfully ping from the Mobility Controller to CPPM, this indicates that there is network connectivity between these two devices. The lack of a record in Access Tracker suggests that the issue may not be with the RADIUS/EAP certificate or user credentials, but possibly with the ClearPass service itself or its reception of authentication requests. The Event Viewer can provide detailed logs that might reveal internal errors or misconfigurations within CPPM that could prevent it from processing authentication attempts properly.

The correct approach for capturing packets from a wireless client in a WLAN that uses Tunnel forwarding mode and WPA3-Enterprise, managed by an Aruba Mobility Controller and Campus APs, is to use an Air Monitor (AM). An AM is specifically designed to capture wireless traffic "in the air," which means it listens to the wireless signals transmitted between devices and the access points. This method ensures that the capture includes all the necessary details while maintaining the integrity and security of the data as it is transmitted over the air. Using an Air Monitor helps in analyzing the raw wireless traffic before it gets encrypted or tunneled to the Mobility Controller, providing a clear view of the wireless client's activity and interactions. The information regarding the use of Air Monitors for packet capture in such environments can be found in the Aruba Network's official documentation and configuration guides for WLAN setups and security analysis.

A rogue radio operating in ad hoc mode with open security can pose several threats to a network. Ad hoc networks allow direct device-to-device communication without centralized control. If such a radio is present within or near a corporate environment, it can potentially be used to create a peer-to-peer network that bypasses corporate security controls, effectively acting as a backdoor into the corporate network for unauthorized users or devices. This can lead to a breach of data security and unauthorized access to network resources.