CAP Exam Dumps - The SecOps Group AppSec Practitioner Questions and Answers

The vulnerability described is anInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), where manipulating the order_id (e.g., 53870) allows unauthorized access to other users’ orders. The fixes proposed by Bob and John aim to obscure the numeric value of order_id to prevent easy guessing or manipulation:

Bob’s Fix (SHA1 Hash): Replaces order_id=53870 with order_id=1ff0fe6f1599536d1326418124a261bc98b8ea1 (SHA1 hash of 53870). While this obscures the original value, an attacker can still attempt to hash potential order IDs (e.g., 53871, 53872) and test them in the URL. If the application directly uses the hash to look up the order without validating the user’s authorization, the vulnerability persists. SHA1 is aone-way hash, but it does not inherently enforce access control.

John’s Fix (Base64 Encoding): Replaces order_id=53870 with order_id=NTM4NzA= (Base64 encoding of 53870). Base64 is a reversible encoding, and an attacker can easily decode NTM4NzA= back to 53870 using standard tools. If the application decodes it and uses the original value to fetch orders without authorization checks, the IDOR vulnerability remains.

Evaluation: Both fixes address the symptom (disclosing the numeric value) but fail to address the root cause: lack of authorization validation. The application must ensure that only the authenticated user can access their own orders, regardless of the order_id format (numeric, hashed, or encoded). Neither fix includes such a check, so the vulnerability persists.

Option A ("Both solutions are adequate to fix the problem"): Incorrect, as neither solution enforces authorization.

Option B ("Both solutions are inadequate and the vulnerability is still not fixed"): Correct, as both SHA1 hashing and Base64 encoding are superficial changes that do not prevent unauthorized access.

Option C ("Only John’s solution fixes the problem"): Incorrect, as John’s Base64 encoding is reversible and does not fix the IDOR issue.

Option D ("Only Bob’s solution fixes the problem"): Incorrect, as Bob’s SHA1 hashing also does not address the authorization flaw.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)" and "Access Control Best Practices."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "IDOR Mitigation," "Cryptographic Hashing," and "OWASP Access Control Testing Guide" sections.

Asymmetric key encryption (also known as public-key cryptography) uses a pair of keys: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption (or vice versa for signing). Symmetric key encryption, on the other hand, uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. Let’s evaluate the options:

Option A ("AES"): AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a single key (e.g., 128, 192, or 256 bits) for both encryption and decryption, making it a symmetric algorithm, not an asymmetric one.

Option B ("RSA"): RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. It uses a public key to encrypt data and a private key to decrypt it, making it a classic example of asymmetric cryptography.

Option C ("Diffie-Hellman"): Diffie-Hellman is an asymmetric key exchange algorithm. While it is primarily used for key exchange rather than direct encryption, it relies on asymmetric principles (public and private keys) to securely establish a shared secret, so it is considered part of asymmetric cryptography.

Option D ("DSA"): DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) is an asymmetric algorithm used for digital signatures. It uses a pair of keys (public and private) for signing and verification, making it an asymmetric algorithm.

The correct answer is A, as AES is the only symmetric algorithm listed, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cryptography Fundamentals" and "Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Encryption."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Cryptographic Algorithms," "Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption," and "OWASP Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet" sections.

The screenshot shows an HTTP response header from https://example.com with a 404 status. Let’s evaluate each option:

Option A ("The application discloses the framework name and version"): The X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.5-5 header reveals the server is running PHP version 5.4.5-5, which is a security risk as it exposes the framework and version. This information can help attackers identify known vulnerabilities, making A incorrect (i.e., it is a problem).

Option B ("The application reveals user-agent details"): The response does not include user-agent details; it only shows the server’s configuration. User-agent details are part of the request, not the response, so this is incorrect (not a problem here).

Option C ("A cookie is set with HttpOnly and a Secure flag"): The Cookie header includes HttpOnly and Secure attributes, which are best practices to prevent JavaScript access and ensure transmission over HTTPS, respectively. This is correct behavior, so it is not incorrect.

Option D ("The application accepts insecure protocol"): The response uses https://, indicating a secure protocol (TLS), and there’s no evidence of accepting insecure protocols like HTTP. This is not incorrect.

Thus, the incorrect statement is A, as disclosing the framework name and version via X-Powered-By is a security misconfiguration. This aligns with the CAP syllabus under "Security Headers" and "Information Disclosure."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Security Misconfigurations," "HTTP Headers," and "OWASP Top 10 (A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration)" sections.

The code snippet loads a JavaScript file from a third-party CDN with integrity and crossorigin attributes. Let’s analyze what these attributes do:

The integrity attribute specifies a Subresource Integrity (SRI) hash (e.g., sha384-Fmb0CYeA6gM2uLuyvqs7x75u0mktDh2nKLomp3PHkJ0b5vJF2qF6Gbrc/6dK), which the browser uses to verify the integrity of the loaded script. If the script’s content does not match the hash, the browser will not execute it, protecting against tampering (e.g., if the CDN is compromised).

The crossorigin="anonymous" attribute ensures the request does not send credentials (e.g., cookies) and allows the script to be loaded from a different origin while enabling CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing).

Option A ("The code snippet will perform validations for Cross-Site Scriptingattacks"): Incorrect. XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) involves injecting malicious scripts into a page. The integrity attribute ensures the script’s integrity but does not validate the script’s content for XSS vulnerabilities (e.g., if the script itself contains malicious code). XSS prevention requires other measures, like Content Security Policy (CSP) or input sanitization.

Option B ("The code snippet will perform validations for Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks"): Incorrect. CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) involves tricking a user into making unintended requests. The integrity and crossorigin attributes do not address CSRF, which requires server-side protections like CSRF tokens.

Option C ("The code snippet will perform Subresource Integrity (SRI) checks"): Correct. The integrity attribute explicitly enables SRI, ensuring the browser verifies the script’s hash before execution. This protects against supply chain attacks where a third-party script might be modified maliciously.

Option D ("The code snippet will perform validations for Outdated Javascript checks"): Incorrect. The snippet does not check for outdated JavaScript versions. SRI ensures the script matches the expected hash but does not validate the script’s version or security status.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Subresource Integrity (SRI)" and "Third-Party Script Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "SRI Implementation," "Third-Party Resource Security," and "OWASP Secure Coding Practices" sections.

The robots.txt file is a text file placed in a website’s root directory to communicate with web crawlers (e.g., Googlebot) about which pages or resources should not be accessed or indexed. It uses directives like Disallow to specify restricted areas (e.g., Disallow: /admin/). However, robots.txt is not a security mechanism; it is only a request to crawlers, and malicious bots or users can ignore it.

Option A ("Developers must not list any sensitive files and directories in this file"): Correct. Listing sensitive files or directories (e.g., Disallow: /secret/) in robots.txt can inadvertently expose their existence to attackers, who can then attempt to access them directly. The best practice is to avoid mentioning sensitive paths and rely on proper access controls (e.g., authentication, authorization) instead.

Option B ("Developers must list all sensitive files and directories in this file to secure them"): Incorrect. Listing sensitive paths in robots.txt does not secure them; it only informs crawlers to avoid them, and it can serve as a roadmap for attackers.

Option C ("Both A and B"): Incorrect, as A and B are contradictory; B is false.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as A is true.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Web Crawler Security" and "Information Disclosure Prevention."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "robots.txt Usage," "Information Exposure," and "OWASP Web Security Testing Guide" sections.

GraphQL Introspection is a built-in feature of GraphQL that allows clients to query the schema of a GraphQL API at runtime. This process involves sending introspection queries (e.g., __schema or __type) to retrieve information about the API’s structure, including available types, fields, queries, mutations, and their relationships. This capability is powerful for developers to explore and document APIs but poses a security risk if left enabled in production, as attackers can use it to map out the entire API structure and identify potential attack vectors.

Option A ("A technique for testing the compatibility of the GraphQL API with other systems"): Incorrect, as introspection is about schema discovery, not compatibility testing.

Option B ("A technique for testing the performance of the GraphQL API"): Incorrect, as performance testing involves load or stress testing, not schema exploration.

Option C ("A technique for discovering the structure of the GraphQL API"): Correct, as introspection is specifically designed to expose the API’s schema and structure.

Option D ("A technique for testing the security of the GraphQL API"): Incorrect, as security testing is a separate process; introspection itself is a feature, not a security test.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "GraphQL Security" and "API Introspection."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "GraphQL Fundamentals," "Introspection Risks," and "OWASP API Security Top 10" sections.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a vulnerability that allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into web pages viewed by other users. These scripts execute in the context of the victim’s browser, enabling various exploitations. Let’s evaluate each option:

Option A ("Steal the user's session identifier stored on a non HttpOnly cookie"): This is possible with XSS. If a session cookie is not marked as HttpOnly (preventing JavaScript access), an attackercan use a script to access document.cookie and steal the session ID, leading to session hijacking.

Option B ("Steal the contents from the web page"): This is also possible. An XSS payload can manipulate the DOM, extract content (e.g., via innerHTML), and send it to the attacker, such as through a GET request to a malicious server.

Option C ("Steal the contents from the application's database"): This is not possible with XSS alone. XSS operates on the client side within the browser’s sandbox and cannot directly access the server-side database. Database access requires server-side vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL injection), which is a separate attack vector. Thus, this exploitation is not feasible through XSS.

Option D ("Steal the contents from the user's keystrokes using keyloggers"): This is possible. An XSS script can inject a keylogger (e.g., using onkeydown events) to capture keystrokes and transmit them to the attacker, especially on pages where sensitive data (e.g., forms) is entered.

Therefore, the correct answer is C, as XSS cannot directly exploit the database. This distinction is crucial in understanding attack vectors, a core topic in the CAP syllabus under "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)" and "XSS Mitigation."

References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "OWASP Top 10," "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)," and "Client-Side Attack Vectors" sections.

The scenario describes an e-commerce website where a user can view order details by manipulating the order_id parameter in the URL (e.g., https://example.com/order_id=53870). A security researcher found that changing the order_id allows access to arbitrary orders and sensitive data, indicating an authorization issue. This is not a simple input validation problem (e.g., SQL injection or path traversal), as the input (order_id) is processed, but the system fails to enforce proper access controls. This is a classic case of Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR), where an attacker can access resources by guessing or manipulating identifiers without proper authorization checks. The root cause is a weak authorization mechanism, likely tied to poor session management orprivilege validation, allowing unauthorized users to view others’ data.

Option A ("The root cause of the problem is a lack of input validation..."): Incorrect, as the issue is not about invalid input (e.g., malicious code) but about unauthorized access to valid data. Whitelisting might help sanitize input, but it doesn’t address authorization.

Option B ("The root cause of the problem is a weak authorization (Session Management)..."): Correct, as the problem stems from inadequate authorization checks. Validating user privileges (e.g., ensuring the user can only access their own orders) or improving session management (e.g., tying orders to user sessions) can fix this IDOR vulnerability.

Option C ("The problem can be solved by implementing a Web Application Firewall (WAF)"): Incorrect as a standalone solution, as WAFs mitigate certain attacks (e.g., SQLi, XSS) but are not a substitute for fixing authorization logic. A WAF might detect patterns but won’t enforce proper access control.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as Option B accurately identifies the root cause and solution.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Authorization and Access Control" and "OWASP Top 10 (A04:2021 - Insecure Design)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Session Management," "Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)," and "OWASP Top 10" sections.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) occurs when an attacker tricks a user’s browser into making an unintended request to a site where the user is authenticated, potentially performing actions like changing a password. Let’s analyze the request:

The request is a POST to /changepassword with a Cookie: JSESSIONID, indicating the user is authenticated via a session. The Content-Length: 95 and payload (new_password=lov3MyPiano23&confirm_password=lov3MyPiano23) suggest a state-changing operation (password change).

CSRF vulnerability arises when the request lacks a unique, unpredictable token to validate its legitimacy, and the server accepts it based solely on the session cookie. The request includes no CSRF token (e.g., in the body or headers like X-CSRF-Token).

The Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin header indicates the request originates from the samedomain, but this is a browser feature and does not guarantee server-side protection against CSRF from a malicious site (e.g., via a hidden iframe or form submission).

Without a CSRF token, an attacker could craft a malicious HTML page with a form that submits this exact request when a victim visits their site while authenticated to example.com, exploiting the browser’s automatic inclusion of the JSESSIONID cookie. This is a textbook CSRF vulnerability.

Option A ("True"): Correct, as the request lacks a CSRF token, making it vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Option B ("False"): Incorrect, as the absence of a CSRF token indicates vulnerability.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "CSRF Prevention," "Session Security," and "OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.

SQL injection vulnerabilities allow attackers to manipulate database queries, potentially accessing unauthorized data, including file contents, if the database supports such operations. In MySQL, theLOAD_FILE()function is specifically designed to read the contents of a file on the server where the database is hosted, provided the file exists, the database user has appropriate privileges (e.g., FILE privilege), and the file is readable. For example, SELECT LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd') could extract the contents of the /etc/passwd file if exploitable.

Option A ("READ_FILE()"): This is not a valid MySQL function.

Option B ("LOAD_FILE()"): This is the correct function for reading file contents in MySQL, making it the right choice for exploitation.

Option C ("FETCH_FILE()"): This is not a recognized MySQL function.

Option D ("GET_FILE()"): This is also not a valid MySQL function.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "SQL Injection" and "Database Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Injection Vulnerabilities," "MySQL Security Features," and "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)" sections.