CAP Exam Dumps - The SecOps Group AppSec Practitioner Questions and Answers

Null Byte Injection is a vulnerability where a null byte character (\0 or ASCII 0) is injected into user-supplied input to manipulate application behavior, often bypassing filters or terminating strings prematurely in languages like C or C++ that rely on null-terminated strings. In web applications, this is typically encoded in URLs using percent-encoding (e.g., %xx, where xx is the hexadecimal value). The ASCII value of a null byte is 0, which is represented as %00 in URL encoding.

Option A ("%01"): Represents the ASCII character with value 1 (Start of Heading), not a null byte.

Option B ("%10"): Represents the ASCII character with value 16 (Data Link Escape), not a null byte.

Option C ("%25"): Represents the % character itself (ASCII 37), not a null byte.

Option D ("%00"): Represents the null byte (ASCII 0), which is the correct URL-encoded form used in Null Byte Injection attacks.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Injection Attacks" and "Input Validation Bypasses."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Null Byte Injection," "URL Encoding," and "OWASP Injection Prevention" sections.

The screenshot shows a login form where the user coder@viewer attempts to log in, and the application responds with "User does not exist." Let’s evaluate the statements:

Option A ("The application is vulnerable to username enumeration"): Correct. Username enumeration occurs when an application reveals whether a username exists in the system, often through distinct error messages. Here, the message "User does not exist" for coder@viewer directly indicates that the username is invalid, allowing an attacker to enumerate valid usernames by testing different inputs and observing the responses (e.g., "Invalid password" for existing users vs. "User does not exist"). Best practice is to use generic error messages like "Invalid username or password" to prevent enumeration.

Option B ("The application is vulnerable to brute-force attacks"): Incorrect. There’s no evidence in the screenshot of a lack of brute-force protections (e.g., rate limiting, account lockout). Brute-force vulnerability would require additional context, such as no CAPTCHA or no lockout mechanism, which is not shown.

Option C ("The application does not enforce a strong password policy"): Incorrect. The screenshot does not provide information about password requirements (e.g., length, complexity), so we cannot conclude whether a strong password policy is enforced.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as A is true.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Username Enumeration" and "Authentication Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Authentication Best Practices," "Enumeration Attacks," and "OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet" sections.

Cookies can have security attributes to enhance their protection against various attacks. The question asks which attribute ensures that the cookie is only sent over a TLS (encrypted) channel, meaning it is transmitted securely via HTTPS and not over unencrypted HTTP.

Option A ("Secure"): The Secure attribute ensures that the browser only sends the cookie over a secure, encrypted connection (i.e., HTTPS). If a request is made over HTTP, the browser will not include the cookie, preventing it from being intercepted in plaintext. This is the correct answer.

Option B ("HttpOnly"): The HttpOnly attribute prevents the cookie from being accessed by JavaScript (e.g., via document.cookie), mitigating XSS attacks that steal cookies, but it does not enforce transmission over TLS.

Option C ("No_XSS"): This is not a valid cookie attribute; it appears to be a made-up termand does not relate to TLS enforcement.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as the Secure attribute directly addresses the requirement.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cookie Security" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Cookie Security Attributes," "Secure Session Management," and "OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet" sections.

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is a security mechanism that allows servers to specify which origins can access their resources, relaxing the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) for legitimate cross-origin requests. CORS uses specific HTTP headers to control this access. The key header for controlling access to resources isAccess-Control-Allow-Origin, which specifies which origins are permitted to access the resource. However, among the provided options, the closest related header isAccess-Control-Allow-Headers, which is part of the CORS standard and controls which request headers can be used in the actual request (e.g., during a preflight OPTIONS request).

Option A ("Access-Control-Request-Method"): This header is sent by the client in a preflight request to indicate the HTTP method (e.g., GET, POST) that will be used in the actual request. It is not used by the server to control access.

Option B ("Access-Control-Request-Headers"): This header is sent by the client in apreflight request to list the headers it plans to use in the actual request. It is not used by the server to control access.

Option C ("Access-Control-Allow-Headers"): This header is sent by the server in response to a preflight request, specifying which headers are allowed in the actual request. While Access-Control-Allow-Origin is the primary header for controlling access, Access-Control-Allow-Headers is part of the CORS standard to manage header-based access control, making this the best match among the options.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as Access-Control-Allow-Headers is a CORS header.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "CORS Security" and "HTTP Headers."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "CORS Configuration," "Security Headers," and "OWASP Secure Headers Guide" sections.

The request is a POST to /dashboard with a payload containing XML data, specifically an xml_foo parameter with a declaration and an XML entity (). Let’s analyze the vulnerability:

The payload defines an XML External Entity (XXE) with , which instructs the XML parser to fetch the contents of /etc/passwd (a sensitive system file) and include it in the &example; reference. The XML then includes &example;, which would expand to the contents of /etc/passwd if the parser processes the entity.

This is a classicXML External Entity (XXE) Attack, where an attacker exploits an XML parser’s ability to process external entities to access unauthorized resources (e.g., local files, internal network services) or cause denial-of-service. If the application’s XML parser is misconfigured to allow external entity resolution, this attack can disclose sensitive data like /etc/passwd.

Option A ("Path Traversal Attack"): Incorrect. Path Traversal involves manipulating file paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to access unauthorized files. While the attack aims to access /etc/passwd, it does so via XML entity resolution, not path traversal.

Option B ("Server Side Template Injection"): Incorrect. SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) involves injecting template expressions (e.g., {{7*7}}) into a server-side template engine. The payload here is XML, not a template expression, and targets XML parsing, not a template engine.

Option C ("XML Bomb Attack"): Incorrect. An XML Bomb (or Billion Laughs attack) involves recursive entity expansion to cause denial-of-service (e.g., ), leading to exponential growth in memory usage. This payload defines a single external entity to fetch a file, not a recursive expansion, so it’s not an XML Bomb.

Option D ("XML External Entity Attack"): Correct, as the payload exploits XXE by defining an external entity to access /etc/passwd.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "XML External Entity (XXE) Attacks" and "OWASP Top 10 (A04:2021 - Insecure Design)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "XXE Vulnerabilities," "XML Parsing Security," and "OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet" sections.

Google Dorks are advanced search operators used to find specific information or vulnerabilities on the web. Directory listing vulnerabilities occur when a web server exposes the contents of a directory (e.g., file names, paths) due to misconfiguration. The operators intitle: and intext: are used to search for specific terms in the title or body of web pages, respectively, combined with site: to limit the search to a specific domain.

Option A ("intitle:'Index of' site:victim-app.com"): Correct, as intitle:"Index of" targets pages with "Index of" in the title, a common indicator of directory listings, and site:victim-app.com restricts the search to that domain.

Option B ("intext:'Index of' site:victim-app.com"): Correct, as intext:"Index of" searches for "Index of" within the page content, another reliable indicator of directory listings, combined with the domain restriction.

Option C ("Both A and B"): Correct, as both intitle: and intext: can effectively identify directory listings, making this the most comprehensive answer.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as both A and B are valid Google Dorks for this purpose.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Reconnaissance Techniques" and "Google Dorking."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Information Gathering," "Google Hacking," and "OWASP Testing Guide" sections.

The HTTP request is a GET to /help.php with a parameter file=../../../etc/passwd. Let’s analyze the vulnerability:

The file parameter includes ../ sequences, which are used to navigate up the directory structure (.. moves up one directory level). The request attempts to access /etc/passwd, a sensitive system file on Linux servers that contains user information.

This is indicative of aPath Traversal Vulnerability(also known as Directory Traversal), where an attacker manipulates file paths to access unauthorized files outside the intended directory. If the server does not sanitize or restrict the file parameter, it may serve the contents of /etc/passwd, leading to sensitive information disclosure.

Option A ("Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability"): CSRF involves tricking a user into making an unintended request, typically via a malicious form or link. This request does not indicate CSRF; it’s a direct attempt to manipulate file access, so this is incorrect.

Option B ("Path Traversal Vulnerability"): As explained, the ../ sequences in the file parameter are a clear attempt at path traversal, making this the correct answer.

Option C ("Code Injection Vulnerability"): Code injection involves executing malicious code (e.g., PHP, SQL), but this request aims to read a file, not execute code, so this is incorrect.

Option D ("All of the above"): Since only Path Traversal applies, this is incorrect.

The correct answer is B, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Path Traversal" and "OWASP Top 10 (A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Path Traversal Attacks," "Input Validation," and "OWASP Secure Coding Practices" sections.

Insecure Deserialization occurs when untrusted data is deserialized by an application, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code, manipulate objects, or cause denial-of-service. If user input is not validated or sanitized, many languages and frameworks are vulnerable to this issue because deserialization often involves reconstructing objects from serialized data, which can include malicious payloads.

Option A (".NET"): .NET applications (e.g., using BinaryFormatter or XmlSerializer) areprone to Insecure Deserialization if untrusted data is deserialized without validation. For example, BinaryFormatter can execute arbitrary code during deserialization, a well-known vulnerability (e.g., CVE-2017-11882).

Option B ("Java"): Java’s ObjectInputStream is notoriously vulnerable to Insecure Deserialization. Libraries like java.io.Serializable can execute code during deserialization of untrusted data, as seen in vulnerabilities like Apache Commons Collections (CVE-2015-7501).

Option C ("PHP"): PHP applications using functions like unserialize() are vulnerable if they deserialize untrusted input. For example, an attacker can craft a serialized object to trigger a gadget chain, leading to remote code execution (e.g., CVE-2016-7124).

Option D ("All of the above"): Correct, as .NET, Java, and PHP all have deserialization mechanisms that, if not properly secured, can lead to Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities when handling untrusted input.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Insecure Deserialization" and "OWASP Top 10 (A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Insecure Deserialization," "Serialization Security," and "OWASP Deserialization Cheat Sheet" sections.